Part 05 · four matched 1986 slides

Reading

Printed slide 40 · 1986 PDF p.42

1986 PDF · Richards 2020 PDF p.41 · Richards slide · Revised PDF p.41

Unretouched 1986 printed slide 40, PDF page 42
Historical pattern · 1986

Carl von Clausewitz · On War · 1832

Character/nature of war

  • An act of policy to use violence to impose one’s will upon another.
  • Duel or act of human interaction directed against an animate object that reacts.
  • Uncertainty of information acts as an impediment to vigorous activity.
  • Psychological/moral forces and effects (danger, intelligence, emotional factors, …) either impede or stimulate activity.
  • Friction (interaction of many factors, including those above) impedes activity.
  • Genius (harmonious balance of mind/temperament that permit one to overcome friction and excel at the complex activity of war) changes the nature and magnifies the scope of operations.
Two inward-facing braces relate the paired text groupsRight brace of the left group and left brace of the right group face each other, without directional arrows.

Strategy

  • Exhaust enemy by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort.
  • Seek out those centers of gravity upon which all power/movement depend and, if possible, trace them back to a single one.
  • Compress all effort, against those centers, into the fewest possible actions.
  • Subordinate all minor, or secondary, actions as much as possible.
  • Move with the utmost speed.
  • Seek the major battle (with superiority of number and conditions) that will promise a decisive victory.
A common brace joins both groups to the conclusion belowHorizontal grouping line spans the two columns and points down at the centered conclusion.

Aim

“Render enemy powerless”—with emphasis on “the destruction of his armed forces.”

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Printed slide 41 · 1986 PDF p.43

1986 PDF · Richards 2020 PDF p.42 · Richards slide · Revised PDF p.42

Unretouched 1986 printed slide 41, PDF page 43
Historical pattern · 1986

Carl von Clausewitz · On War · 1832

Critique

  • Clausewitz overemphasized decisive battle and underemphasized strategic maneuver.
  • Clausewitz emphasized method and routine at the tactical level.
Two inward-facing braces relate the paired text groupsRight brace of the left group and left brace of the right group face each other, without directional arrows.

Why?

  • Clausewitz was concerned with trying to overcome, or reduce, friction/uncertainty. He failed to address the idea of magnifying adversary’s friction/uncertainty.
  • Clausewitz was concerned with trying to exhaust adversary by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort. He failed to address, or develop, the idea of trying to paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to expend effort.
  • Clausewitz incorrectly stated: “A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely”—then argued that this is the place where the blows must be aimed and where the decision should be reached. He failed to develop idea of generating many non-cooperative centers of gravity by striking at those vulnerable, yet critical, tendons, connections, and activities that permit a larger system to exist.
A common brace joins both groups to the conclusion belowHorizontal grouping line spans the two columns and points down at the centered conclusion.

? · Raises question · ?

What does all this mean?

The scan’s handwritten correction “larger system” is adopted above in place of “larger center of gravity.”

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Printed slide 42 · 1986 PDF p.44

1986 PDF · Richards 2020 PDF p.43 · Richards slide · Revised PDF p.43

Unretouched 1986 printed slide 42, PDF page 44
Historical pattern · 1986

Carl von Clausewitz · On War · 1832

Message

Clausewitz did not see that many non-cooperative, or conflicting, centers of gravity paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directed fashion, hence they impede vigorous activity and magnify friction.

Likely result

Operations end in a “bloodbath”—via the well regulated stereotyped tactics and unimaginative battles of attrition suggested by Clausewitz.

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Printed slide 43 · 1986 PDF p.45

1986 PDF · Richards 2020 PDF p.44 · Richards slide · Revised PDF p.44

Unretouched 1986 printed slide 43, PDF page 45
Historical pattern · 1986

Jomini · 1861

Secret of success

“… the narratives of Frederick the Great: commenced to initiate me in the secret which had caused him to gain the miraculous victory of Leuthen. I perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple maneuver of carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the hostile army … I found again, afterwards, the same cause in the first successes of Napoleon in Italy, which gave me the idea that by applying, through strategy, to the whole chess-table of a war this same principle which Frederick had applied to battles, we should have the key to all the science of war.”
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