Slide source comparison

1986 · printed slide 43

Jomini · 1861

Secret of success

“… the narratives of Frederick the Great commenced to initiate me in the secret which had caused him to gain the miraculous victory of Leuthen. I perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple maneuver of carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the hostile army. … I found again, afterwards, the same cause in the first successes of Napoleon in Italy, which gave me the idea that by applying, through strategy, to the whole chess-table of a war this same principle which Frederick had applied to battles, we should have the key to all the science of war.”

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1986 · printed slide 44

Jomini · The Art of War · 1836

Aim

To make evident a “secret” for success in war.

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1986 · printed slide 45

Jomini · The Art of War · 1836

Critique

• Preoccupation with form of operations, spatial arrangement of bases, formal orders of battle, and tactical formations.
• Lack of appreciation for the use of loose, irregular swarms of guerrillas and skirmishers to mask own dispositions, activities, and intentions as well as confuse and disorder enemy operations.

Likely result

• Operations become stereotyped—unless one can appreciate Jomini’s ideas outside their formal underpinnings.

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1986 · printed slide 46

Napoleon · Clausewitz · Jomini

Key point

Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini did not appreciate importance of loose, irregular tactical arrangements and activities to mask or distort own presence and intentions as well as confuse and disorder adversary operations.

? — Why — ?

Major flaw

Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini viewed the conduct of war and related operations in essentially one direction—from the top down—emphasizing adaptability at the top and regularity at the bottom.

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1986 · printed slide 47

Emil Schalk · Summary of The Art of War · 1862

“There are three great maxims common to the whole science of war; they are—

1. Concentrate your force, and act with the whole of it on one part only of the enemy’s force.
2. Act against the weakest part of your enemy—his center, if he is dispersed; his flank or rear, if concentrated. Act against his communications without endangering your own.
3. Whatever you do, as soon as you have made your plan, and taken the decision to act upon it, act with the utmost speed, so that you may obtain your object before the enemy suspects what you are about.”

Caution

While these maxims by Schalk portray, in a general way, physical maneuvers that can be used to realize one’s purpose in war at the strategic level, they do not address the non-adaptability and predictability (via the drill regulation mind-set) that permeated 19th century “maneuvers” at the tactical level.

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1986 · printed slide 48

Impact of 19th century technology on war

Result

Huge armies, and massed firepower and other vast needs supported through a narrow fixed logistics network, together with tactical assaults by large stereotyped formations, suppressed ambiguity, deception, and mobility hence surprise of any operation.

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1986 · printed slide 49

Technology and the art of war

• The legacy of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini’s tactical regularity and the continued use of large stereotyped formations for tactical assault, together with the mobilization of large armies and massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network, “telegraphed” any punch hence minimized the possibility of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and mobility to generate surprise for a decisive edge.
• In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and debilitating casualties on all sides during the:

American Civil War

1861–65

Austro-Prussian War

1866

Franco-Prussian War

1870

Boer War

1899–1902

Russo-Japanese War

1904–05

World War I

1914–18

Point

• Evolution of tactics did not keep pace with increased weapons lethality developed and produced by 19th century technology.

? — Raises question — ?

• Why were the 19th century and early 20th century commanders unable to evolve better tactics to avoid these widely felt and debilitating casualties?

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1986 · printed slide 50

Impact of 19th century capitalism on insurrection/revolution

(with a Marxian flavor)

Comment

• A look back reveals that we have been speaking of conflict between social systems, rather than within social systems. With the explosive expansion of capitalism in the 19th century we begin to see the rise of much turmoil and attendant conflict due to opposing tendencies contained within capitalism itself.

Trend

• Without going into explicit detail we find (according to many investigators, including Karl Marx): that the interaction of competition, technology, specialization (division of labor), concentration of production in large scale enterprises, and the taking and plowing back of profits into this interaction produce opposing tendencies and periodic crises that leave in their wake more and more workers competing for jobs in fewer, but larger, firms that increasingly emphasize (percentage-wise) the use of more machines and less labor.

Result

• Low paid wage earners exhibit discontent and hatred for a system that permits others to live in comfort or luxury while they must live a life of toil, subject to strict and frequently harsh factory discipline.
• Witnessing these unfolding circumstances disillusioned intellectuals, bankrupt owners, and others take the side of the workers, as an enlightened vanguard, to mold them into a powerful opposition.

Raises question

• How should such an unpleasant situation be corrected?

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1986 · printed slide 51

Impact of 19th century capitalism on insurrection/revolution

(with a Marxian flavor)

Message

• According to Marx/Engels and their followers, the only way out is via revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat (workers) to smash the capitalistic system and replace it with one that does not exploit and oppress masses for the benefit of a ruling elite or class.

Necessary conditions for success

• Crisis generated by discontent/misery of masses and vacillation by authorities who indicate an unwillingness or inability to come to grips with existing instability.
• Vanguard, or disciplined hard core, that offers leadership, provides a way out, and has support of masses.

Why

• Crises represent height of confusion/disorder due to many opposing tendencies (centers of gravity) that magnify friction, hence paralyze efforts by authorities to dominate such surges of turmoil. In this sense, crises are periods of vulnerability/weakness that beg to be exploited.
• Vanguards represent disciplined moral/mental/physical bodies focused to shape and guide masses as well as participate in action to exploit and expand confusion/disorder of crises that shake adversary’s will to respond in a directed way.

Key insight

• Crises and Vanguards are the golden keys that permit us to penetrate to the core of Insurrection/Revolution and, as we shall see later, Modern Guerrilla Warfare.

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1986 · printed slide 52

Capitalism, technology and the conduct of war

• The creation of crises and vanguards, via 19th century capitalism, make evident the foundations upon which to conduct insurrection/revolution in order to destroy a society from within.

On the other hand

• It is not yet clear how these notions change or fit-in to the way we exploit technology and conduct war against societies from within as well as from without. To gain such an appreciation we must look at the period containing World War I, World War II, and their aftermath.

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1986 · printed slide 53

World War I

• Plans and execution
• Stagnation
• Finale

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1986 · printed slide 54

Schlieffen strategic maneuver · 1914

Key: rust: German origin formations and advances; blue-green: lower/interior formations and subsidiary directional strokes; color does not establish allegiance; gray dashed line and dotted boundaries: source line distinctions, not newly inferred dates. Hatching and stipple distinguish source areas. U1 marks provisional fine symbols/unit numbers. No calibrated scale.

1986 geometry; later video/Richards schematic is substantially simpler. Open diagram.

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1986 · printed slide 55

World War I

Result

Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected along paths of hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed firepower and infantry.

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