Slide 126
Synthesis
Okay. With that in mind, let's go to the synthesis.
Chapter 6 / 6
Editor’s introduction
The final chapter brings the earlier comparisons together and asks how to put them into practice. Boyd moves from operations and strategy to grand strategy, connecting the disruption of an adversary with the constructive task of sustaining our own support and freedom of action. He then returns to his doubts about fixed principles of war. The closing audience discussion tests these ideas against questions about public support, credibility, command and organization; the slide-deck bibliography follows.
Slide 126
Okay. With that in mind, let's go to the synthesis.
Slide 127
Slide 128
Let's start laying it out. What is our goal? In some sense, you're trying to diminish your adversary's freedom of action while improving yours, so that he cannot cope with things that begin to unfold, and you can 42. So when you cut his lines of communication, when you disorient and do the kind of thing we're talking about, you're really inhibiting his freedom of action.
And so your plan: you want to probe to unmask his strengths, weaknesses, and maneuvers. In other words, […]. Sun Tzu […] Sever moral ties, disorient his mental images, etc. Mask, distort, magnify […]. Sometimes mask, sometimes distort, sometimes magnify.
That in turn gives you the ability to select initiative or response that is least expected, whether it be morally, mentally, or physically. That'll permit you to establish focus, the main effort together with other efforts, and pursue directions that permit many happenings. Doesn't mean you make them all, but you have all kinds of possibilities. You want to put him on the horns of many dilemmas [Meaning-changing wording unresolved.].
Offer many branches and threaten alternative objectives. You can't get a good picture of what's going on. And then, to keep that operation going, move along paths of least resistance. Right? That allows the paths of least resistance to manifest themselves, and then you just start exploiting. Keep pulling the system down further.
Now here's an interesting one: exploit rather than disrupt or destroy those differences or those features within his system that interfere with his ability to cope with unfolding things. Let me give you an example, particularly in guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas, if you have a corrupt province chief, don't really like to take him out, because if they take out the corrupt province chief and put someone in there good, then they don't have their basis for the guerrilla movement.
So if I have a corrupt province chief, they can use that as a recruitment effort to build up their own guerrilla cadre. So they don't want to take him out, unless it's really bad and the people really demand it. Instead, they'll lever that system to build up their own movement. Of course, after they've got it made, then they'll take him out and probably execute him. But not at the time. They'll use him as a rallying point to build up their own efforts. You see what I'm getting at there? 46
Okay, and then subvert, disorient, and disrupt those things that allow him to keep his own act together. [Passage unclear.] And the action: […]. Exploit his vulnerabilities.
Your support: mobile communications, essential logistics. Maintain the pace of operations […]. And command: I call this command with a light touch 49. As a matter of fact, these ideas I have here are very, very similar to the ones Mao has 50. Very similar things.
How many people have read [… guerrilla warfare]? Anybody? Mao. The last two or three pages 52.
Exchange, speakers uncertain: […] Pardon? Pardon? […] “Finally stumped us on one.” […] Yeah. Very interesting. Okay.
Now I want to draw your attention to the plan—
Slide 130
To do that, I want you to read some comments made by Napoleon that have bearing upon those plan and action statements. This is Napoleon speaking.
Look what he's saying there. He says, “Hey, you know, it's a tough job. It's hard to keep track.” If that's the case, invert the argument. If it's tough for him to keep track, what we're saying is that's a human vulnerability, a weakness. So you want to turn it around and feed that. That makes it even more difficult […].
So let's turn the whole argument around. When we do that, we come up with an idea we call grand tactics.
Slide 131
When you're dealing with plans and actions, you're dealing with grand tactics or operations. You're trying to get inside; you're trying to create a tangle, threatening and/or non-threatening. You're trying to enmesh him in an amorphous, [unclear] unpredictable world—[…] doubt, et cetera.
And/or pull him back inside himself. In other words, if a guy can't cope with the world, you tend to pull him back inside himself, which makes him even more disoriented. He can't keep up. Literally pull him back inside himself. And once you do that, thereby […].
You'd be surprised how people like to fall back inside themselves anyway. 3
Okay? Let's go to the second impression.
Slide 132
Where I made a comment about transients […] the intention. You want to state it this way: transients under the action, […] intention. And we stated all these before: probe and test, employ variety, et cetera.
But look at […]. Severing moral ties, disorient, subvert, disorient, disrupt, et cetera. You're doing all these things. Here's what you're trying to do—your payoff. And the key words are either explicit or implicit in these statements. Tie this together with this.
Then you can look at what I call the generalized strategy.
Slide 133
You see, the key idea is to be able to penetrate the system. You can bring that out. Go all the way back to Sun Tzu and work forward. How many times? People don't say it. […] The key idea is to penetrate the inside of the system: his mind, his time, his space, or his moral, mental, physical being.
Slide 134
So then, if you paste it all together, you have your tactics, which feed your grand tactics, which feed your strategy, which feed your strategic aim. And they overlap. […] But it's coherent. See how they all play together.
Another way of thinking about it—what I call an alternative portrait.
Slide 135
[Aside unclear.] It's supposed to pull somebody apart. That's one way to think about it. I'll show you another way so you can take a look.
They tend to be very destructive. The ones we've shown so far are very destructive in nature. So, with that in mind, we can think of it in this sense.
Slide 136
You're synthesizing lethal effort, maneuver, and moral. Here's your idea, and there's your aim. Different ways you can perceive it.
Now, you're talking about a political campaign. Remember earlier we talked about isolating your adversary and maintaining your support base—moral, mental, physical. Isolate his, maintain yours, do not let him do the same.
Slide 137
What I call an underlying insight here: unless you can penetrate his moral, mental, physical being, sever those bonds […]—[…]—it's very difficult.
That, in turn, allows you to isolate him from his allies or any outside support, as well as internally—internally, the body can't function. The name of the game is really penetration and isolation.
Just reflect upon everything we discussed today, all the way back to Sun Tzu: you do see a theme emerge again and again. Okay?
Slide 138
That raises a rather interesting question, which relates to something you asked earlier. How do we connect these notions to a national goal? Move it up.
Slide 139
One, a grand strategy to support the national goal. And the second one is particularly important: pump up our resolve, drain away adversary resolve, attract the uncommitted.
In Vietnam we pumped up theirs, drained away ours, and they attracted the uncommitted. We lost. Which suggests: if you're going to pump up yours, drain away theirs, and attract the uncommitted, you've got to know your enemy, know yourself, and the uncommitted. Remember I said Sun Tzu only had two of those? You've got to know three.
In politics you understand that, because you've got to know your adversary, yourself, and also the people out there. Which way are they going to go?
Slide 140
In any case, if you paste it together, you can kind of lay out, in one statement, a semblance of what I call a grand strategy. We amplify our spirit and strength. Now in a military or nation-state sense, you're talking about political, economic, social, et cetera. You're talking about strength.
But at the same time, in the basis of it, […]. You're not going to get there—ideologue or ideologue, whatever you want to call them. You'll start filtering stuff through this imprint you've got in your brain. It's probably going to hurt you. Okay.
Slide 141
You don't have to read them all; we've all seen them before. So now we’re back to the national goal. […] That's basically what we're trying to do.
Guess what? That's not a national goal; that's my individual goal. That goal shows at every level, […]. But the point I'm trying to bring out here: these upper two tend to be constructive in nature, whereas the bottom four here tend to be destructive in nature. The upper two tend to operate over a longer time horizon; the bottom four over a shorter time horizon.
Slide 142
And that's the nature of this note. […]
For example, let's say you go in and take a country that spent many years building up its defenses, and it collapses in a few weeks. Well, those citizens would be irate at their leaders, saying, “We spent all this; the whole thing came […].” So you've got a lot going for you as a conqueror, if you behave. If you misbehave, you lose it all.
Because, see, the leaders would be seen as morally corrupt, incompetent, […]. Like France. 11 But if you misbehave—
Slide 143
Now let's kind of review and expand a little bit differently. I want to go into something here, and then we're going to leave our session. Let's read that chart.
Unifying vision—every once in a while you’ve got to have that unifying vision or unifying ideal. If you can get something like that, you've really got a lot going for you, I'd say. Worth the investment. It takes time. Okay?
And here's the point I'm leading to. It really gives you a theme for what I call survival and conquest in many different directions.
Slide 144
Basically what we're talking about here: unifying vision, grand ideal or overarching theme. Individuals […] societies can shape and adapt, yet offers a way to expose adversaries' flaws. You can do that, boy, you've really got something.
And that's where the Marxists were strong for so long. They had a so-called utopian ideal. In the meantime they're making capitalists look like a bunch of jerks and taking over the world. Wasn't one of the most significant events out of World War I the establishment of the first communist state? World War II permitted what? The expansion of communism. They've gained both ways. They should […] both world wars.
And if they're the focus of evil and the evil empire, how do we explain all this expansion? [Meaning-changing wording unresolved.]
And then, of course, ingredients needed to pursue that vision—these kinds of things. There's your basic aim. Now we've got a problem here. If you tend to be this way, you tend to lose this. If you have this, you don't tend to have that. The Russians and Hitler had this kind of stuff, but they weren't able to do this. We seem to be able to do this, but we have a hard time getting that.
In other words, those are harder to put together […]. But if you can get an external […], a compelling external […], like we had during World War II, […] Hitler, then you can have both this and this. In other words, if something's really perceived as a menace to your society, I don't care whether that's another society or something that's […] over you, if you really make that compelling—
Now, what's happened to the Marxian philosophy? See, they had no track record. Before there were any communist states, there was no track record—all these ideal statements. Now there's a track record; they have a lot of problems. We can expose those problems instead of saying they're just evil. […] You want to say, “Hey, wait a minute,” just start laying it out. […] You've got a lot of problems; you can leverage that if you wanted to. You should.
But do it the way that […]. Don't do it the way that you're down in the sewer. That's not so good, because then you'll hurt yourself. Very important. Okay.
I'm going to skip the Application. 15 I'll go right to the wrap-up.
Slide 173
Slide 174
Now let's start pasting some things together.
In other words, do you want to be the hoser or the hosee? Let's get down to the fundamentals here.
Slide 175
And that's it. […]
Now, when you sever his moral bonds—in a sense, with the new things I'm looking at—when you penetrate his system and do certain things, he causes himself to sever his own moral bonds. In other words, where he starts to violate some of his own ideas, not only internal, but external allies too. Okay?
Now I want you to read this chart, and I'll make some comments on it.
Slide 176
Some implications surrounding these things. In a tactical sense, in terms of multidimensional interactions, they suggest spontaneous, synthetic, creative, rather than step-by-step analytical, logical, and discrete.
Know what I'm saying? Increasing [unclear] complexity. […] You know how I define complexity? Some people get unhappy about that. I define it differently. Variety is not necessarily complexity. Variety without harmony, then it's complex. Variety without apparent harmony.
I can have variety; as long as I can see the harmony in it, then it's not complex for me. But if I can't see the harmony, I've got a problem. Variety without harmony. So complexity—one man's complexity may be another guy's harmony. So it's a very personal kind of thing.
In a strategic sense, we want to use that variety and rapidity, so it makes it very difficult. The other guy can't read you, can't keep up.
So basically what we're saying: up here we're trying to pump up—17—I mean, we're trying to reduce our friction and our time in order to cope with things. Down here we're trying to pump up our adversary's friction and increase his time so he can't cope. In other words, we want to get a mismatch of friction and time, so we get that leverage, make it difficult.
And what I'm suggesting here: if you start setting up very complex arrangements—in other words, where you don't have that harmony with that variety—then you've got a problem. In other words, can you internalize those relationships that you've set up? If you can't internalize them and there are many out there, you've got a problem.
You know, just like when you drive a car, there are a lot of complex things to do. But you don't have to think about it; you do it. It's complex unless you see the harmony. But once you put it together —it’s not complex. So can you set your organization up so people just naturally do it? It operates in a very harmonious way without having to be explicitly detailed. In other words, those implicit connections or bonds […].
Okay, with that in mind, we can look at it a little differently.
Slide 177
We go back and go over all the subcategories […]. What we're really saying here is: variety and rapidity allow us to magnify our adversary's friction, stretch out his time to respond to that. Likewise, we have harmony and initiative in our system to diminish our own friction and compress our time […] variety […].
So if you paste all four of these together, it allows us to literally pull our adversary back inside himself. He can't cope, can't stay on top.
So this tends to be the destructive side, and then you're more on your constructive side here. Remember, you always want to keep in mind […] destructive effort also, because you just don't do destruction. You want to always build up the support for yourself.
How many people here have read Clausewitz? [Intervening words unclear.] Well, in his Book One he said: look, if you're looking at a society, think of three components—the government, the armed forces, and the people. Not bad.
Now, if you're going to put a coup d'état on somebody, all you're doing is trying to replace one government with another. If you're talking about blitzkrieg, you're working against the armed forces and the government. If you're talking about guerrilla warfare, you're primarily working on the people. You're trying to siphon them away from the government and armed forces, so they've got nothing to work with.
Of course, that's politics also: trying to siphon the people away from your adversaries. You get the votes; he doesn't. You get in power; he doesn't. Same game.
Slide 178
So now, with that in mind: if you want to pretend you're a modern Sun Tzu, and you want to make these statements—the art of success. A very simple way of looking at it.
That's good politics. Now let's go to the epilogue, and then we'll finish up. This is the last part of it.
Slide 179
Slide 180
And of course that's the nature of this chart here, the fact that I was unsettled. So I said: let's look at some principles of war—
Slide 181
—or military art […]. So I'll show them to you from four countries: USA, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France. You don't have to read them in detail. 3
The key thing is, the USA and the United Kingdom are quite close here. The Soviet Union is a bit different. Plus, the Soviet Union's got the so-called mobility and tempo […]. And the French only have three […].
The point is, they're all different. And Germany doesn't have any, or didn't. I don't know if they have some now or not. So let's critique.
Slide 182
First, it doesn't reveal […] how they interact […] mechanism […]. But the second […] is the more meaningful one. Because what I'm saying here is: scientific laws and principles are the same for all countries and tend to change little over time. On the other hand, we know that it's different for different countries. And over time we see it change.
So if you have a so-called principle of war, think of it in this sense: Newton's second law of motion, F equals ma. You don't have F equals ma for one country, something for another country. F equals ma, or it doesn't equal ma, regardless of whether you're Russian, Chinese, British, American, or what.
I don't know—particularly when you see the different principles, some countries don't even have any. They're talking about the same phenomenon. How can they be principles of war?
So this would suggest I'm saying they're not principles. They seem to be some kind of a laundry list or checklist people are trying to keep in mind, whatever it is. I don't know. They're certainly not principles. They really don't […].
Slide 183
But maybe there's an alternative possibility. Now, we've looked at a lot of stuff, but why not collect these bits and pieces and assemble them and see what we have?
Slide 184
And here are some things we looked at […] to put them together. Remember, we want to compress our time and stretch out the adversary's time. Invert it: you want to compress his and stretch ours out? Boy, certainly not. […]
We want to generate these unequal distributions and basically gain that moral-mental-physical […]. We want to pump down our friction and pump up our adversary's friction. In other words, we're trying to generate all these mismatches in our favor as much as possible.
In other words, the idea being to get inside his OODA loop, or inside his mind-time-space […]. And if we can realize that, it gives the basis to penetrate his organism and bring about his collapse. At the same time, we want to be able to do this: amplify our spirit.
Slide 185
So now we've pasted all that together. My final chart—you're probably wondering when I'm going to get there—what I call a general central theme that we've been talking about here all day.
It took longer than normal because I was digressing. 24
That is it. Are there any questions? Got a comment?
Audience member, inferred: You talked about how maneuver and moral conflict is better than the attrition conflict. […]
Audience member: […]—like Vietnam, as an example. The American public or the press wants immediate results, and that’s why—is that not a reason why—
Boyd: Let me go back, since I talked about that earlier. You’re on something here, and you’re on an important comment there. Remember what I said earlier, a couple hours ago? I said—[…].
I just wanted to get some other information. I made a comment where Weinberger said, we’re not going to get any more conflict unless we have the support of the American people. You’re touching on that, that’s right.
And then I went back and said, yeah, but in Vietnam, when we started that, we had the support of the American people. Which raises the question: what happened? Why did we lose it? Why did it all drain away?
Because we put out all these phony reports of all the progress we were making. The press got wise to that and started printing it back in this country. Plus the fact, remember, we had that one-year rotation policy: people going over and back. They’re coming back, all those comments saying it’s not working. It’s diffusing through our society. We couldn’t stop it because the guys are coming back; they’re even talking about it.
So now we have a mismatch between what the government is saying and the events as they’re playing out. Support went right through the floor. [Unclear.]
World War II: nobody said that war was going to be over early. In fact, Churchill said, “Blood, sweat, and tears.” Couldn’t even promise them victory. We really made the enemy look bigger than they were. He says, goddamn, we’re going to have to work this problem; otherwise we’re not going to make it.
We, in Vietnam, knew we had all the resources. We were on top. We didn’t call up the reserves, didn’t get everybody’s support. Plus we started lying when our goddamn progress wasn’t going good. [Exchange unclear.]
Speaker uncertain: Why do you lie? Audience member: Do you think we have a little disinformation going on from the other side?
Boyd: Yeah. And you’re always going to have that. Everybody says, you know, the Russians are always pumping out disinformation. You think we go around the world and tell the truth to everybody? We didn’t even tell the truth to our own people. We said we were succeeding, but we weren’t. That’s disinformation.
I know that’s not pleasant to hear, but that goes on. You’ve got to face up to it. I’m trying to tell you: you don’t correct your mistakes—
Audience member: [Question unclear.]
Boyd: Let me go back one point before I hit you. Hang on to your question. I know it’s hard to accept. Let’s go back to DIVAD 6. The Army went out, with the blessing of the Pentagon. They put this tape out. They [unclear whether “gave” or “didn’t give”] a copy to Denny Smith.
They showed these drones exploding in the air. Look at that thing hitting accurately. They forgot to tell the guys they were command-destructing those from the ground. That’s disinformation. But then, when he was told that happened, he came unglued. And he should have.
Then the word got out; the whole press got it. They command-destructed those drones. End of DIVAD. So don’t say we don’t pump out disinformation. We do.
I’m not saying you shouldn’t have deception in war. You may need it. But it goddamn well better work, and you better understand what you’re doing before you get into it.
It’s going to be there. But when you’re in a situation where it’s going to drain out over time, and you’re putting stuff out, you know that’s eventually going to get out. Particularly so when we had these one-year tours: people are going there and coming back and saying, […]. And they’re talking to everybody and their friends. And the press is over there getting information. The whole thing came unraveled.
Audience member: A campaign example would be if you put out information on a poll […], and three or four other polls come out that are diametrically opposed to what your campaign has done.
Boyd: Say again? Yeah, not too good. Particularly if they look into it and say, gee, this is a rigged poll. […] Because they’ll start: well, how did they poll? What were their techniques? Find out it took a narrow sample, or something—a selected group—in order to make it look good.
In other words, rig the poll so you get the results you want, just like you rig the test so you get the results you want.
And you’ve got to be very careful. I’m serious about it.
Audience member: In the instance you were talking about, the guerrilla warfare, going after the moral—
Boyd: Incidentally, that doesn’t mean the other guy’s done it all right either. I’m not saying that, because […]. Really, when you’re thinking, you’ve got to think about these things. Go ahead.
Audience member: And you were referring to the statements by General Balck.
Boyd: By who?
Boyd: I’m even getting it wrong. He’s the guy who talked to me.
Audience member: He said, as an effective commander, you need to inspire your men and then give them a mission and let them go do it. We got in trouble. We got in trouble last time we did that, back in 1972.
Boyd: Okay. Now, if you’re going to do that, you know what I said—I made something very […]—
Audience member: You did say, be prepared to stand by them.
Boyd: Well, but I said something else. If you’re going to do that kind of thing and let them do it, that suggests—I didn’t say […]. You better have that common outlook so you understand the kind of things they’re going to be doing and the constraints you’re going to have upon that.
[Exchange unclear.] They got in trouble because they weren’t supposed to be in there—the Democratic headquarters. You’re violating cultural constraints. In this country, that sort of thing you really shouldn’t do.
Audience member: Well, we got carried away with the game.
Boyd: Well, yeah, but see, you’re in the United States. Whether you’re one political party or another, or you’re one aspect of society, there are certain cultural constraints upon you […]. And if you violate that—of course, if you don’t get caught, you might be all right. But if it gets caught, all of a sudden you’re in deep yogurt. They might have thought, well, we’re going to make it free. But they didn’t.
And they paid the price. Got to keep those things in mind. Back to you.
Audience member: […] Was it part of the strategy to put out disinformation? Was it some grand plan that they had, that they had to do that? Or what was the purpose behind the disinformation?
Boyd: Well, if you’re going to get in war, relative to your adversary, and you want to pump out disinformation or misinformation, or allow him to draw his own incorrect conclusion when you’re operating—
But on the other hand, if you’re going to be in an operation, you say, boy, we really need the support of the American people. We say, we don’t even have to call up the reserves. Look what happened. They didn’t call up the reserves. They said we can operate this economy full-blown, plus we can fight that little—that wasn’t even a war, it’s a two-bit thing over there. And one-year tours. Well, if that’s the case, how come it didn’t end so fast?
See, that’s why the draft, I think, is important. I know it’s unpopular. The draft and calling up the reserves—when you do that kind of thing, people say, hey, this is kind of serious. And then don’t underplay what you can do. Say, we’ve really got to pull this one together.
Another thing: call up the Guard and Reserves […]. In fact, I think a large portion of the force should be Guard, because the Guard and Reserve have very strong moral ties to their local community.
And if you’ve got the support of the people and bring them up, that tends to solidify that and keep it together. And if you do that, then you have a greater option for playing deception games, because now people […]—we’ve got to be careful; we could lose this thing and make us look like a bunch of jerks.
[…] this is really no big thing. You have your Cadillac; you have this, and you have a little war going on.
See, World War II, there was no doubt. Everybody was saying, hey, we may not make it. So we better really lean into this.
I remember it very vividly. We had ration cards, couldn’t get gas, couldn’t get this. Of course, we had an opponent where that was easy to do: a guy by the name of Adolf Hitler. That helped a lot. So if you make your opponent look like Hitler, you’ve got a lot going for you. It’s got to be compelling.
But see, the point is, we went in there with the support of the American people. Then we pumped out all these phony stories of how we were doing. It wasn’t paying off because we wanted to be able to show progress.
Audience member: Relating all this to what we did in […], so that was a bad decision on their part? Too much bad information at the wrong time, and they never backed away from that, right? What you’re saying is—
Boyd: Yes, they may have put it out for initial confidence. But if they really saw that was going bad, they better replay that music, and replay it in such a way—you can always structure yourself so you say, look, granted this thing’s tougher […]. You might even be able to get more support.
But you have to be very careful when you do that. I’m serious, you really do. But if you keep trying to hide it when they know it’s otherwise, and you keep digging in your heels, it’s going to pull you down. It’ll just pull you down.
Audience member: On the other side of it, about polling, if you pump out and say that your poll was worse than it actually was, at that point you’re starting to get inside these people […].
Boyd: Say that loud. You’re saying something very important. I want to amplify that. You’re saying something very important here.
Audience member: If, for instance, you get a poll and you’re, say, 45 percent or something, you have a press conference and say that you’re only at 35 percent. The other guys are looking at their polls: wait a second, what kind of poll is that guy looking at? That sets them to thinking what’s going on, confusing them.
Boyd: Let me give you another aspect. I’ll let you in a minute. There’s one of the things that we’ve done—some people I’ve operated against, and some people have a hard time doing. Once they see they have success, they want to take every little bit of it.
I said, wait a minute. You know, the data’s not that […]. We know that. I’m talking about like an engineering airplane […]. Let’s understate it, goddammit. We know no matter how we look at it, this is okay. Yet it feeds our case for the argument we’re trying to prove. So let’s understate the case.
Then what happens when you do that? You make your case; the other side’s going to check it out. When they find out you’ve understated […]. Which is another aspect of the thing you’re saying. There are different ways that can be done. Go ahead.
Audience member: Okay. I want to change the discussion here entirely to a different subject, because it’s a problem that I’ve encountered in campaigns. We’re talking about entropy, which is kind of the natural dissolution of everything. That’s kind of what campaigns are: they’re organized chaos.
And it seems sometimes it’s very hard even to get any rigidity in an organization, to try to make it function and do certain things. At the same time, here we’re trying to be as flexible as possible. That seems almost contradictory.
For instance, if you’re trying to put together a literature drop, that takes a lot of organization and planning. And you’ve got a lot of people running around who’ve never done a literature drop before. So there has to be some rigidity of function.
Boyd: Okay, note what you said: a lot of people have never done that before. What did I tell you before about common outlook and that kind of stuff? I said, if you don’t have a common outlook, or people haven’t done things before, you’re going to have to have more detailed instruction.
Remember what I said about Balck 21? Remember, he said, if you’re a division commander, you may have some people in there that you can give a long leash, and they can do it. Other people you better watch carefully; they’re going to get you in trouble. That’s exactly what you’re talking about right now.
Now politically, the campaign is operating over sort of a short period—of course, nowadays I don’t know whether they’re short anymore—and there are new people flooding in. So you have that problem.
But on the other hand, the military, who might have guys there for years [are transferred in and out], still adopt rigid attitudes. I think you people are more flexible. [I've never been political—just from your comments and your remarks.] Of course, some people may not be. If they’re not flexible enough, they may not be around after a while either, politically speaking.
But I think this is the thing: it’s a common outlook. So if you have a real good shared outlook with certain people, you don’t have to give them a lot of instructions. With certain people I work with, we’ve worked together so long in different enterprises that I just get on the phone, say a couple words, and hang up. I know it’s okay. And I say, just check back and tell me how it’s coming. He’ll say, it’s going. That’s good enough. Press.
You always want that feedback. But that doesn’t mean you want to give a person detailed instructions. You always want to keep getting feedback, just enough to be sure. And you have to understand, there’s a certain trust; there’s a certain bond. And you have to face up to it if it’s not going right.
That’s one of the hardest things I’ve had to teach people: if it’s not going right, face up to it right now, because we can look at it. You wait, it may be too late. You look at it, say, look, we can redo it. It doesn’t mean […] per se. You didn’t assess it correctly; some of us may miss it. We see, okay, yeah, we can begin to reconstruct. But you wait too long, you’re in a bag; it’s too late.
And that’s why I talked about those informal loops. […] With those informal loops, you’re not only getting your formal perspective, you’re getting other perspectives. Then you can start meshing them together, see if they tie together, so you get a better overall image of what’s taking place.
I used to encourage my people: beat the bushes around the Pentagon. I didn’t care […]. Beat the bushes, have a ball. As long as we understand what we’re about. Let’s not play some dirty games.
Any more?
From the Richards/Spinney May 2026 slide deck. Earlier versions contain additional entries.
Bibliography versions differ. Compare the reference panels with the earlier slides below.
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