Physical, mental and moral conflict

[…] Let's talk about the categories of conflict. I'm going to phrase it a little differently, but I'll show you how […].

So we're talking about three kinds, from the military viewpoint: attrition, maneuver, and moral. I've laid out some salient examples. These are not exhaustive examples. You might have some in your own mind. Look at the attrition warfare, maneuver conflict, or moral. I'll let you look at them, and I'll make some comments.

You'll also notice that I juxtaposed the Emperor Napoleon versus General Bonaparte […]. You'll also notice I stuck Patton and MacArthur under maneuver. Patton primarily in a tactical sense; MacArthur more in a strategic sense. And moral, of course, is not only Mongols, but guerrilla leaders. You can get counter-guerrilla leaders like Magsaysay who played that very heavily.

With that in mind, let's look at each one of those: attrition, maneuver, and moral. We're going out of order. First, attrition.

Boyd: Pardon? [Question unclear.] Well, he plays the moral game very heavily. He plays the maneuver too, and they have some […]. Very emphasis on the moral game. Of course, that's […] moral and maneuver. Okay?

Attrition observations.

Here's the key thing. Firepower is king. Everything else is subordinate. Protection—trenches and armor—is used to weaken or dilute the effects of enemy firepower. Mobility is either to bring firepower to bear or evade enemy fire. And the measures of success—how often have we seen it?—are body count, targets destroyed.

Notice the Pentagon always likes to talk about how many bodies they pump out, or targets destroyed. In fact, we have a term over in the Pentagon called target servicing. Well, when you're talking about that, that's an attrition mentality. It's a definite attrition mentality.

Then you see this begin to take place: seize and hold terrain objectives, instead of going after the enemy's armies or his forces. The guy says, that's not true. Let me see your operational order: right in there, take this hill or take that terrain. I said, it's right there. Well, we didn't mean it. I said, take it out. Why do you have it in there, then? Could you change that order? You can say, go and operate in this sector, take out the force, […] the force that exists here. If you have to take the hill, fine. If not, don't take it. ²¹⁰

Not only that, you've seen instances in the past where we've taken a hill, we spend a lot of blood, and the next day we leave it. We kill all those guys and depart. If the terrain were so valuable, why didn't we stay there? The arguments tend to fall apart.

Now, with that in mind, let's lay out what I like to call the essence or picture of attrition warfare.

Basically, you're creating and exploiting these kinds of things: destructive force […], protection, mobility. So you're interplaying these, and here's your payoff. ³⁹ Note this. Isn't this a noble aim: compel enemy to surrender and sue for peace? What if they don't show up? That's nice, but if they don't show up, it doesn't take.

What do you get out of that image or picture that I display there? Anybody? What? Keep going. You're right on. What did you say, [Tom?]? You're on the right track. It's like you're just beating them into submission. Therefore it has a high physical content. Remember, we talked about moral, mental and physical. Attrition has a very high physical content. That's the point. You're right on. It's like beating them into submission. Physical.

With that in mind, let's look at maneuver.

Now these kinds of things begin to come forth: ambiguity, ambivalence. The idea is to generate that surprise […]. And if you're talking about war, you're not only talking about fire; you're talking about movement—fire and movement in combination. Whether you want to call it cheng/ch'i, Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, whatever you want. The idea: on one hand you're trying to tie them up so you can exploit his vulnerabilities and weaknesses on the other hand ⁴¹.

Instead of having measures of success, note I've got indications that tend to be qualitative. The key idea is any phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change. So long as you get him in a position where it makes it very difficult for him to adapt. I'm just giving some examples: […], disorder, high prisoner counts. That's right, when you start getting all kinds of prisoners, that means he's very confused and disordered. Can't keep up.

Let me cite an example here. Many of you people have seen a basketball game. Ever notice when one team starts getting it together and the other starts coming unglued? You can't measure that. All you know is they're not working together. What do they do, the first thing? Pretty much it's called time-out so you can get your act back. You can't measure that.

So why do we use targets destroyed and body count? We can measure it and we can insert it in the computer. I guess after the bar chart goes up so high, they're supposed to throw the towel in, but they don't.

Another example: Guderian, when he went through France. He sensed it. He says, my God, I can smell rot in the French army. Now's the time to go. Couldn't measure it. He said, now's the time to really stick it in good and hard, and they did. At least until they got to Dunkirk. Remember, if you look at the campaign, they were trying to make them go slower than that. They were going in and just diving right into their system ⁴³.

Audience, inferred: You consider the Iraqi-Iranian war [Question unclear.]?

Boyd: I haven't looked at that. They're back to Verdun, World War I. They're back into—not maneuver, attrition. They're just pumping bodies and people and artillery back and forth. But note what we're talking about: you can't measure, you sense it.

Just because you can't measure it doesn't mean it's unimportant. Remember I said that earlier. How do you put pressure in a computer? How do you put inability to keep up into the computer, in a mental sense? But by looking at certain events, by what's unfolding, you say, hey, these guys are coming unglued. They're not keeping up. Now we can leverage. Or we can set events up so we can put them in that position so we can leverage. Okay?

Now let's look at the essence of maneuver conflict.

And here's a note directed toward that. [Passage unclear.] In other words, when you're surprised, in a sense you're overloaded, even if for a short period of time. So surprise and shock, in another sense, […] overload. So if that's the case, let's reset up.

Here's what we're trying to do. We're trying to disorient the guy, disrupt him; we're trying to overload him. He can't cope. Note that […].

Think about it in your own life. There are times when a lot of things happen and you have a hard time adapting. Now, go for it. When you try to back off, people usually let you off the hook. What if they don't? You're in deep trouble.

And, of course, you can think of the aim this way, or you can think of it that way. But now look at that chart. What's the highest content there? That has a high mental content. Attrition has a high physical content; maneuver has a high mental content. Look at it and see.

Most often you see it in the newspaper, […], it's about troops going down this highway or that. You don't get the whole picture. You've got to bring in the mental aspect. You don't dislocate a mind; you disorient. And when a guy's mentally disoriented, is he coping with a situation or is he isolated from it? So you've got mental isolation. Okay?

Now let's go into the moral aspect. Like I said, I spent a lot of time with General Balck. ¹¹ In any case, his theme—note this—no recipes for organization, communication, tactics, leadership. No recipes. No scheme. In other words, he wants to be adaptable and unpredictable. ¹²

Wide freedom for subordinates […], yet harmonized within the intent of superior command ¹³. Matter of fact, we had a meeting in one of the assistant secretaries' offices. This guy […]: “How do you tell the guys—?” […] “We just lay down the mission. Once it's agreed upon, he determines how it will be carried out. I go do something else.”

“Well, how do you know he's going to do it your way?” He said, “Why is that important? So long as he gets the job done. He probably will do it differently, but he is different than I.” Very revealing: our people want everybody—you know, cookie-cutter—stamped out the same way.

[Passage unclear.] And note this: must create a bond based upon trust, not mistrust. Trust, not mistrust. Now when you start talking about trust and mistrust, you're getting what? When you think of trust and mistrust, you're getting to the moral domain. That's a moral domain.

How is this atmosphere achieved? Only one way: by example. Physical energy, mental agility, moral authority ¹⁶. And if you can demonstrate those kinds of things, then you can get people to cooperate and take those initiatives.

What is the price? No free lunch in this game. Courage to share danger and discomfort at the front. In other words, you've got to be able to share those same goddamn problems other people share. Then they know you understand. Willingness to support and promote even unconventional and difficult subordinates who can accept danger, demonstrate initiative, take risks, etc.

As a matter of fact, in the German equivalent of what we call our OER—everybody know what OER means? Officers Effectiveness Report—they had a statement, a code word, up at least to World War II: “This officer is a difficult subordinate.” And that meant promote early. In our system, it's […].

And he explains it very well. He says if you've got a guy that has these characteristics, he's going to be a pain in the rear to a superior. Automatic. He's going to have different ideas. “Gee, you know, it's different. You're doing it different. We didn't do it that way.” You've heard people say it. So what? The question is: has it been thought through? Can it be done in that kind of way? And is it within your moral culture? Once you've answered yes to that, then what's all this nonsense?

You can't violate your culture either, but […]. Also, dedication and resolve […]—be able to think of it differently, instead of having the so-called definitive, elegant solution, or that one we've used, the standard solution for the last ten years. ²⁵⁹

And the benefit: internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability. You say, my God, that's a strange one. But it really isn't. If you've done all this, you've forged those implicit connections, or bonds, one with the other. You have those shared images, so you can tell somebody to do something, and it's done. You adapt instead of having these long, detailed orders, new instructions, all that. It's inherent.

Now here's a chart on a book that I read—or passages lifted out of a book I ran into […]. It really caused these passages to leap out at me. The underlines are mine.

The key point I'm trying to make: if you look at these things that are underlined, they're all very directly related to one another […]. So let's build upon that relationship.

And so if we look and start pulling some things together, some insights […]. All I'm saying is these ideas are related to one another. I showed the previous chart. If you look at those comments—[Falls, The Art of War, pages] 124, 161, and 165 ²²—they suggest that moral effects are related to the menace posed by the Zeppelins […], and the uncertainty associated with not knowing what to expect or how to deal with it. […]

So for a first cut, we can say, in some sense, moral effects must be related to menace and uncertainty. It's a way of thinking about it. A way. But it seems to leave things out. In other words, we don't bring in the collective aspect, collective moral strength. Or, as we'll point out here, the idea of trust. Remember, guerrilla commanders—other people have to try to generate mistrust. We're all talking about having trust.

So if you're living in an environment of conflict, adversarial relationships, these things come together. You have to deal with this: trust and mistrust. So it really suggests, if you put it all together, that moral strength in some way represents the capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust. Menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.

So building upon that, we're making some definitions here. This is a way of getting into it. If we go back to Clausewitz, remember, he brought out fear, anxiety, and alienation, and their noble counterweights: courage, confidence, and esprit. If we tie that in with moral strength, we can make these other definitions: moral victory, moral defeat, moral values, moral authority. […] Start piecing that together.

And of course, the one we're going for is moral authority: a person or body can give one courage, confidence, and esprit to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust. I've got some better ways of talking about that […], but I want to go through this right now. In fact, I'm going to come out with some new work. I'm going to do some research on that.

And he brings it very much related, where I say you can't morally isolate somebody; he has to morally isolate himself. Mentally you can, physically you can; morally he really does it himself. You shape circumstances […]. Okay, with that in mind, let's pull it together. ²⁶⁹

What I call, at least for a first cut, the essence of moral conflict. So you're creating, exploiting, magnifying these: menace, uncertainty, and mistrust. And the idea. And the aim.

See, that has a very high negative content.

So it's a suspicion—that's what I have here. It seems to be one-sided. So let's see if we can pick up the positive side. […] Let's see if we pick up the positive side. And a way of getting into that—

Let's just look at mistrust. The presence of mistrust implies a rupture or loosening of human bonds ²⁸. […] we've got to be able to get some kind of harmony so people can build up these bonds of trust. That's one thing.

In dealing with uncertainty, you can't make things certain. Life just doesn't work that way. You have to be adaptable, be adaptable, deal with that uncertainty ²⁹.

And we have to face menace. You just can't say we're going to be friendly. You have to take initiative. You may be unfriendly. On the other hand, you may be able to make it friendly.

So if we paste all these things together, we can remodel, modify that chart somewhat—

And look at it a bit differently, what I call both negative and positive factors, or counterweights. So we have menace, uncertainty, mistrust, and counterweights: initiative, internal drive to think and take action without being urged; adaptability, power to adjust or change; harmony, interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a connected way ³⁰. That doesn't mean they're all one-to-one. […] So then you have both a negative aim and a positive aim.

Boyd: What are moral values? [Words unclear.] What are moral values? Anybody? We use the word a lot. Very important.

Audience, inferred: According to your definition, which works real well, moral values are things a group of people would have in common that enable them to have initiative, adaptability and harmony among each other.

Boyd: That's one way. I'm taking it deeper. I'm going beyond […]. What are they? You know what they are? Let's say everybody could do anything they wanted to do. There are no constraints. Christ, things wouldn't hold together, would they?

So moral values, or moral standards, are constraints on individual behavior so the organic whole can exist. If everybody has freedom of action, you have no organic whole.

Boyd: You may tell them what to do, but that's a constraint, as well as not telling them what not to do. That tells them they have to operate in a directed way. That's a constraint on their individual behavior, of one kind or another. ³² That doesn't mean it's bad.

Audience, inferred: Yet, supposedly in the absence of all constraints, the moral values are what surface. The moral values are the only thing that keep you together in the absence of all constraints.

Boyd: But they are what? You know, you build up moral values over time because of the imprint of your culture, what thou shalt do, what thou shalt not do, or how one will interact with others. So in that sense, a moral value or ethical value is a constraint of one kind or another on how you're going to behave. And that's to allow the group to survive. Think about it.

Look, it's not bad. It's good. But in the end, it's some kind of constraint. You just can't give everybody total freedom of action. The whole thing goes to hell. Thou shalt do this, or thou shalt not do this, or thou will act this way, etc., or however you want to say it. Ethical practices in business, whatever it is. It may not be written down. It makes no difference ³³.

Okay, then moral values in some sense are standards of behavior, codes of conduct, etc. So if you have moral isolation, what do you have? Now we're going to get down here. [Words unclear.] I'm trying to—I'm trying to lead you somewhere. When you morally isolate somebody, really he isolates himself. It's that inability—related to the inability of individuals or groups to abide by codes of conduct, standards of behavior deemed acceptable or essential to others outside of them. That's inability. For example, inability to abide by codes of conduct, standards of behavior or systems of values deemed acceptable or essential to others outside those individuals or groups.

So the alienation takes place when you violate those codes of conduct and standards, because they're deemed acceptable, because it permits the group to exist. You alienate yourself. Now some people do it; they try to get away with it. But once it's surfaced and made visible, […]. In other words, don't hose your friend. Particularly by trying to cover it up. […]

Now that doesn't mean it's not going to happen. Sometimes you may do it and you might not even know you did it, but you better correct it. Most of these things are corrected. They are. [Possibly “You're going to make mistakes.”] Of course, different cultures are going to have different standards, and behavior might be different. These are very important. […]

But mentally you can isolate them. Because what's mental isolation? Inability to do what? Perceive or make sense of what's going on around yourself. So if you can set up the pace of events or cause things to happen, the guy's mentally isolated. He doesn't know what's going on. He's disoriented. [Possible repeated or corrected “disoriented.”]

So now, the military tends to think mostly about cutting lines of communications, you know, that kind of stuff. That's physical isolation. Trying to isolate a guy so he can't get sustenance so he can keep his operation ³⁸. That's a material isolation. Then you go mental isolation: now you get the guy so he's confused, can't keep up, he starts coming unglued. He's demoralized.

Now let's assume you demoralize him because of mental isolation, start seeing things coming unglued ³⁹. And let's say those bonds between them weren't too strong, or there were some little devious things we pretended to overlook. Now remember what I said: defeat is an orphan. And victory has a thousand [word unclear]. Pretty soon everybody's pointing the finger at everybody else ⁴¹. That's when the moral part of these relationships begins to show up. I knew he was a rat. Very important.